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D e b a t e
D AV I D  S H A N K L A N D
Any researcher interested in modern Turkey can
hardly escape the controversy that has surrounded
religion in the last decade. The rise and fall of Er-
bakan and the Welfare Party, the National Security
CouncilÕs secular ÔrecommendationsÕ in February
1997, the partial closure of the I
.
m a m - H a t i p ( r e l i-
giously-oriented) schools, and the formation of
ÔWestern Working GroupsÕ to investigate alleged in-
filtration into the civil service by religious activists,
are just a few instances of how prominent these is-
sues have been. How, as observers, are we to attempt
to understand the significance of these and similar
events in todayÕs Republic?
Studying Secularism:
Modern Turkey 
and the Alevis
There is no simple answer, but it seems pos-
sible to suggest, at least as a starting point
for discussion, two simultaneous but con-
tradictory trends. First, there appears to be a
rapidly growing heterogeneity, particularly
in the large urban centres such as Istanbul,
Izmir and Ankara. The precise reasons for
this are unclear, but certainly linked to
TurkeyÕs growing integration with the out-
side world, and encouraged by the highly
successful (if uneven) economic transforma-
tion of recent decades.
At the same time, it seems that Turkey is
tending to bifurcate sharply between pro-
and anti-secular movements. On the anti-
secular side, there are the popular Islamist
political movements, the Islamic brother-
hoods, the followers of Said-i Nursi, a con-
stellation of Islamic business, media, chari-
ties and associations, and the extremely vio-
lent Hizbullah. On the secular side, there are
the followers of the original Republican
PeopleÕs Party, moderate believers (such as
those who might find themselves holding
the central ground in the True Path Party),
parts of the senior bureaucracy (particularly
the judiciary), much of an increasingly con-
sumerist oriented youth, the military (led by
the army), and not least, almost the entirety
of the unorthodox minority, the Alevis.1
It can be argued that this split is profound.
Even taking into account the fact that peo-
ple may change their perspective, that
movements may sometimes blur into one
another, and that there is a vast difference
between rhetoric and action, the side that
an individual takes in this ideological divide
may lead them into quite different social
contexts in their daily lives: the one likely to
include a combination of religious rituals,
mosque-going, t a r i k a t membership, Koran
courses, right-wing or religious political par-
ties, Islamic discussion groups, Islamic foun-
dations (both economic and pious), the Is-
lamic media and a personal rejection of rev-
elry, ostentation, and overt displays of emo-
tion; the other leading to a less structured
life, but likely to include broad acceptance
of the republican state, its secular ceremony
and ritual, alcoholic drink, dance, and if also
politically committed Ð usually though cer-
tainly not exclusively Ð involvement in left-
wing groups. Indeed, it is this tendency to
ÔbunchÕ along the two sides of the secular/-
anti-secular split that explains much of this
divideÕs volatility, and its potential to harm
Turkey in the coming decades.
Studying secularism
We often remind each other, both at con-
ferences and in our writings, that we should
be as sensitive as possible to diversity with-
in Islamic societies. In spite of this healthy
discussion, it seems that the emergence of
overtly secular movements in Turkey has
not attracted the same attention as the
more actively Islamist trends, whether that
latter study be to stress the Islamist move-
mentsÕ rise or, conversely, their supposed
decline. There is, for example, a persistent
tendency to give more weight to the pro-
nouncements of the Islamifying move-
ments, such as the Nurcus and their related
groups, and discount the more moderate
voice of the Directorate of Religious Affairs,
perhaps assuming that since it is govern-
ment-led, the people with whom it is associ-
ated must in some way be less ÔIslamicÕ. Yet,
many of the thousands of people who work
for the Directorate, along with those who
worship in its mosques and participate in its
wider activities, certainly regard themselves
as genuine Muslims and accept the secular
s t a t e .2 Likewise, we have a far greater
knowledge of the inner workings of the S -
l e y m a n c õ s than we do of the increasingly
visible jeunesse dore who spend great parts
of their lives in clubs, restaurants, pop con-
certs and summer-houses. Yet these people
are still capable of taking vows at a shrine
outside Bosphorus University in an attempt
to pass their university degrees, or of planti-
ng a rose bush at the time of H õ d õ r õ l l e z i n
early May with a little wrapped image of
their desired goal suspended from one of its
branches. Many of these people would re-
ject with anger any imputation that they are
not ÔIslamicÕ, though they are not in the
slightest interested in Islamist politics or in
opposing the secular state.
Õ C u l t u r a l i s m Õ
It can be suggested that this imbalance is
partly a question of the language that we
use, and the categories that we employ to
label Islamic societies. To give an immediate
example, within the immense amount of
journalistic (and therefore prominent if not
in itself powerful) coverage that is attendant
upon Turkey and the European Union, there
is a core of writers, such as Hugh Pope of the
International Herald Tribune or the sepul-
chral anonymous scribes for The Economist,
who maintain that the secular state is in
some way by definition illegitimate, that the
correct course for Turkey would be to re-in-
troduce some form of more overtly Islamic
central state.3 This, bluntly, is part of an ex-
panding curse in sociological writings that
might be deemed ÔculturalismÕ: an implica-
tion that just because people are from one
particular group they have to behave in the
presumed standard fashion for that com-
m u n i t y .
The Alevis
The Alevis, the heterodox minority that
make up perhaps slightly less than 20% of
the population, are a further case in point. In
the dozen years that I have been studying
and conducting fieldwork among them,
there is not the slightest doubt that they
have been undergoing a transformation: a
process of codification of their previously
oral tradition, one that has been rapid and
interesting to witness, resulting in a large
number of publications, an increasingly
strong public profile, and above all, a large
part of its population becoming profoundly
s e c u l a r .
This does not mean that Alevi people are
all the same, far from it. Whilst it is necessary
to make the caveat that the situation is ex-
tremely fluid, there are those who embrace
secularism enthusiastically, so much so that
they wish no longer to regard their culture
as a religion at all, rather as a moral ethic to
help guide their everyday existence within
the Republic. These may regard ÔAlevinessÕ
as being henceforth unnecessary as a sepa-
rate or distinct category. There are those
who, whilst accepting the Republic, wish to
maintain closer contact with their traditions
within a sharply secular nation: these peo-
ple are likely to be active members of the
political left. It is perhaps the smallest dis-
tinct group that seeks more explicit recogni-
tion. For instance, Cem V a k f õ , led by an Alevi
religious figure, wishes to make the govern-
ment teach ÔAlevinessÕ explicitly, basing its
argument on the political principle Ôno taxa-
tion without representationÕ. These people
are likely to regret the social change that
has been forced on to their communities,
and wish for something that they might
refer to as ÔtraditionalÕ Alevi values, though
as their leaders have rarely spent much time
in Alevi villages, they are unlikely to be so at
a l l .4
Varying belief
As researchers, what sort of language
should we use to discuss this diverse social
change? To imply that social change among
the Alevi is predominantly a religious refor-
mulation is mistaken. This is not meant to
imply that the Alevis have become Ôunbe-
lieversÕ Ð something which would distress
and irritate many of their members. Never-
theless, the shift undergone by the majority
appears rather akin to that which Christiani-
ty has undergone in Europe: most Alevis
predominantly experience their music and
dance as a cultural rather than a religious
experience; roughly akin, for example, to at-
tending a Mozart requiem or a Bach cantata
in a cathedral, an event not primarily moti-
vated by religion, regardless of the musicÕs
original social function.
In spite of this emergence of what appears
to be a secular moral humanism, there is an
increasing sense among those who study
the Alevis that their ÔpredicamentÕ should
be linked with that of the Kurds in the east;
casting them as a deprived minority that are
being deprived of their religious rights with-
in the Republic.5 This is precisely the Ôcultur-
alismÕ against which I am attempting to
warn in the study of Turkey. Precisely who is
being ÔdeprivedÕ of their rights? It is worth
re-iterating that, first, within the anti-secu-
lar/secular divide, described above as being
so important and so significant, yet over-
looked, the Alevis have almost in their en-
tirety come out in favour of the founding
Kemalist reforms. They have conspicuously
resisted open calls from the Welfare and
now the Virtue Party to re-identify them-
selves primarily a religious minority. Sec-
ondly, when the immense and growing het-
erogeneity of the Alevi population is taken
on board, it is only the minority who are
seeking reaffirmation of their traditions
through explicit acknowledgement from
the state. Of course, they wish to be free to
act as they wish: this goes for any popula-
tion, but the majority have no desire what-
soever to be recast a millet either by their
traditional religious figures or by well-wish-
ing advisers in international academic and
institutional politics. It would be a tragedy
if, the Republic having escaped much of the
bloody conflict between sectarian move-
ments that was prevalent in the Ottoman
Empire, we as researchers were to con-
tribute to it now through misplaced whole-
sale attribution of characteristics where, in
fact, no such unanimity exists. '
